We generalize Athey's (2001) and McAdams' (2003) results on the existence of monotone pure strategy equilibria in Bayesian games. We allow action spaces to be compact locally-complete metrizable semilattices and type spaces to be partially ordered probability spaces. Our proof is based upon contractibility rather than convexity of best reply sets. Several examples illustrate the scope of the result, including new applications to multi-unit auctions with risk-averse bidders.
Introduction
In an important paper, Athey (2001) demonstrates that a monotone pure strategy equilibrium exists whenever a Bayesian game satis…es a Spence-Mirlees single-crossing property.
Athey's result is now a central tool for establishing the existence of monotone pure strategy equilibria in auction theory (see e.g., Athey (2001) , Reny and Zamir (2004) ). Recently, McAdams (2003) has shown that Athey's results, which exploit the assumed total ordering of the players'one-dimensional type and action spaces, can be extended to settings in which type and action spaces are multi-dimensional and only partially ordered. This permits new existence results in auctions with multi-dimensional types and multi-unit demands (see McAdams (2004) ). The techniques employed by Athey and McAdams, while ingenious, have their limitations and do not appear to easily extend beyond the environments they consider.
We therefore introduce a new approach.
The approach taken here exploits an important unrecognized property of a large class of Bayesian games. In these games, the players'pure-strategy best-reply sets, while possibly I wish to thank David McAdams, Roger Myerson, Max Stinchcombe and Jeroen Swinkels for helpful conversations, and Sergiu Hart and Benjamin Weiss for providing an example of a compact metrizable semilattice that is not locally complete. Financial support from the National Science Foundation (SES-9905599, SES-0214421, SES-0617884) is gratefully acknowledged. and increasing the set of types on which the second is employed, it is possible to move from the …rst best reply to the second, all the while remaining within the set of best replies. With this simple observation, the set of best replies can be shown to be contractible. 2 Because contractibility of best-reply sets follows almost immediately from the pointwise almost everywhere optimality of interim best replies, we are able to expand the domain of analysis well beyond Euclidean type and action spaces, and most of our additional e¤ort is directed here. In particular, we require and prove two new results about the space of monotone functions from partially ordered probability spaces into compact metric semilattices. The …rst of these results (Lemma A.10 ) is a generalization of Helly's selection theorem stating that, under suitable conditions, any sequence of monotone functions possesses a pointwise almost everywhere convergent subsequence. The second result (Lemma A.16) provides conditions under which the space of monotone functions is an absolute retract, a property that, like convexity, renders a space amenable to …xed point analysis.
Our main result, Theorem 4.1, is as follows. Suppose that action spaces are compact convex semilattices or compact locally-complete metric semilattices, that type spaces are partially ordered probability spaces, that payo¤s are continuous in actions for each type vector, and that the joint distribution over types induces atomless marginals for each player assigning positive probability only to sets that can be order-separated by a …xed countable set of his types.
3 If, whenever the others employ monotone pure strategies, each player's set of monotone pure-strategy best replies is nonempty and join-closed, 4 then a monotone pure strategy equilibrium exists.
We provide several applications yielding new existence results. First, we consider both uniform-price and discriminatory multi-unit auctions with independent private values. We depart from standard assumptions by permitting bidders to be risk averse. Under risk aversion, monotonicity of best replies is known to fail under the standard coordinatewise partial order over types. Nevertheless, by employing an alternative, yet natural, partial order over types, we are able to demonstrate the existence of a monotone pure strategy equilibrium with respect to this partial order. In the uniform-price auction no additional assumptions are required, while in the discriminatory auction each bidder is assumed to have CARA preferences. Another application considers a price-competition game between …rms selling di¤erentiated products. Firms have private information about their constant marginal 2 Because we are concerned with monotone pure strategy best replies, some care must be taken to ensure that one maintains monotonicity throughout the contraction. Further, continuity of the contraction requires appropriate assumptions on the distribution over players'types. In particular there can be no atoms. 3 One set is order-separated by another if the one set contains two points between which lies a point in the other. 4 A subset of strategies is join-closed if the pointwise supremum of any pair of strategies in the set is also in the set. cost as well as private information about market demand. While it is natural to assume that costs may be a¢ liated, in the context we consider it is less natural to assume that information about market demand is a¢ liated. Nonetheless, and again through a judicious choice of a partial order over types, we are able to establish the existence of a pure strategy equilibrium that is monotone in players'costs, but not necessarily monotone in their private information about demand. Our …nal application establishes the existence of monotone mixed strategy equilibria when type spaces have atoms. 5 If the actions of distinct players are strategic complements -an assumption we do not impose -Van Zandt and Vives (2006) have shown that even stronger results can be obtained.
They prove that monotone pure strategy equilibria exist under somewhat more general distributional and action-space assumptions than we employ here, and demonstrate that such an equilibrium can be obtained through iterative application of the best reply map. 6 Van Zandt and Vives (2006) obtain perhaps the strongest possible results for the existence of monotone pure strategy equilibria in Bayesian games when strategic complementarities are present. Of course, while many interesting economic games exhibit strategic complements, many do not. Indeed, many auction games satisfy the hypotheses required to apply our result here, but fail to satisfy the strategic complements condition. 7 The two approaches are therefore complementary.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents the essential ideas as well as the corollary of Eilenberg and Montgomery's (1946) …xed point theorem that is central to our approach. Section 3 describes the formal environment, including semilattices and related issues. Section 4 contains our main result, section 6 contains its proof, and section 5 provides several applications.
The Main Idea
As already mentioned, the proof of our main result is based upon a …xed point theorem that permits the correspondence for which a …xed point is sought -here, the product of the players'monotone pure best reply correspondences -to have contractible rather than convex values.
In this section, we introduce this …xed point theorem and also illustrate the ease with which contractibility can be established, focussing on the most basic case in which type spaces are [0; 1], action spaces are subsets of [0; 1], and the marginal distribution over each player's type space is atomless.
A subset X of a metric space is contractible if for some x 0 2 X there is a continuous function h : [0; 1] X ! X such that for all x 2 X; h(0; x) = x and h(1; x) = x 0 : We then say that h is a contraction for X:
Note that every convex set is contractible since, choosing any point x 0 in the set, the function h( ; x) = (1 )x + x 0 is a contraction. On the other hand, there are contractible sets that are not convex (e.g., the symbol "+"). Hence, contractibility is a strictly more permissive condition than convexity.
A subset X of a metric space Y is said to be a retract of Y if there is a continuous function mapping Y onto X leaving every point of X …xed. A metric space (X; d) is an absolute retract if for every metric space (Y; ) containing X as a closed subset and preserving its topology, X is a retract of Y: Examples of absolute retracts include closed convex subsets of Euclidean space or of any metric space, and many nonconvex sets as well (e.g., any contractible polyhedron). 8 The …xed point theorem we make use of is the following corollary of an even more general result due to Eilenberg and Montgomery (1946) .
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Theorem 2.1. Suppose that a compact metric space (X; d) is an absolute retract and that F : X X is an upper-hemicontinuous, nonempty-valued, contractible-valued correspondence.
10 Then F has a …xed point.
For our purposes, the correspondence F is the product of the players' monotone pure strategy best reply correspondences and X is the product of their sets of monotone pure strategies. While we must eventually establish all of the properties necessary to apply Theorem 2.1, our modest objective for the remainder of this section is to show, with remarkably little e¤ort, that in the simple environment considered here, F is contractible-valued, i.e., that monotone pure best reply sets are contractible.
Suppose that player 1's type is drawn uniformly from the unit interval [0; 1]. Fix monotone pure strategies for other players, and suppose that s : [0; 1] ! A is a monotone best reply for player 1, where A [0; 1] is player 1's compact action set. Indeed, suppose that s is player 1's largest monotone best reply in the sense that if s is any other monotone 8 Indeed, a compact subset, X; of Euclidean space is an absolute retract if and only if it is contractible and locally contractible. The latter means that for every x 0 2 X and every neighborhood U of x 0 ; there is a neighborhood V of x 0 and a continuous h : [0; 1] V ! U such that h(0; x) = x and h(1; x) = x 0 for all x 2 V:
9 Theorem 2.1 follows directly from Eilenberg and Montgomery (1946) Theorem 1, because every absolute retract is a contractible absolute neighborhood retract (Borsuk (1966) , V (2.3)) and every nonempty contractible set is acyclic (Borsuk (1966) , II (4.11)).
10 By upper-hemicontinuous, we shall always mean that the correspondence in question has a closed graph.
best reply, then s(t) s(t) for every type t of player 1: We shall provide a contraction that shrinks player 1's entire set of monotone best replies, within itself, to the largest monotone best reply s: The simple, but key, observation is that a pure strategy is a best reply for player Note that h(0; s) = s; h(1; s) = s; and h( ; s)(t) is always either s(t) or s(t) and so is a best reply for almost every t. Hence, by the key observation in the previous paragraph, h( ; s)( ) is a best reply. The pure strategy h( ; s)( ) is monotone because it is the smaller of two monotone functions for low values of t and the larger of them for high values of t.
Moreover, because the marginal distribution over player 1's type is atomless, the monotone pure strategy h( ; s)( ) varies continuously in the arguments and s; when the distance between two strategies of player 1 is de…ned to be the integral with respect to his type distribution of their absolute pointwise di¤erence (see section 6). 11 Consequently, h is a contraction under this metric, and so player 1's set of monotone best replies is contractible.
It's that simple. Two points are worth mentioning before moving on. First, single-crossing plays no role in establishing the contractibility of sets of monotone best replies. As we shall see, ensuring the existence of monotone pure strategy best replies is where single-crossing can be helpful.
Thus, the present approach clari…es the role of single-crossing insofar as the existence of monotone pure strategy equilibrium is concerned. 12 Second, the action spaces employed in the above illustration are totally ordered, as in Athey (2001) . Consequently, if two actions are optimal for some type of player 1, then the maximum of the two actions, being one or the other of them, is also optimal. The optimality of the maximum of two optimal actions is important for ensuring that a largest monotone best reply exists. When action spaces are only partially ordered (e.g., when actions are multi-dimensional with, say, the coordinatewise partial order), the maximum of two optimal actions need not even be well-de…ned, let alone optimal. Therefore, to also cover partially ordered action spaces, we assume in the sequel (see section 3) that action spaces are semilattices -i.e., that for every pair of actions there is a least upper bound (l.u.b.) -and that the l.u.b. of two optimal actions is optimal.
Stronger versions of both assumptions are employed in McAdams (2003) .
12 Both Athey (2001) and McAdams (2003) employ single-crossing to help establish the existence of monotone best replies and to establish the convexity of the set of monotone best replies. Their singlecrossing conditions are therefore more restrictive than necessary. See Subsection 4.1. For a; b 2 A; if the set fa; bg has a least upper bound (l.u.b.) in A; then it is unique and will be denoted by a _ b, the join of a and b: In general, such a bound need not exist.
The Environment
However, if every pair of points in A has an l.u.b. in A; then we shall say that A is a semilattice. It is straightforward to show that, in a semilattice, every …nite set, fa; b; :::; cg;
has a least upper bound, which we denote by _fa; b; :::; cg or a _ b _ ::: _ c:
If the set fa; bg has a greatest lower bound (g.l.b.) in A; then it too is unique and it will be denoted by a^b; the meet of a and b: Once again, in general, such a bound need not exist. If every pair of points in A has both an l.u.b.. in A and a g.l.b. in A, then we say that A is a lattice.
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Clearly, every lattice is a semilattice. However, the converse is not true. For example, employing the coordinatewise partial order on vectors in R m ; the set of vectors whose sum is at least one is a semilattice, but not a lattice.
A metric semilattice is a semilattice, A; endowed with a metric under which the join operator, _; is continuous as a function from A A into A. In the special case in which A is a metric semilattice in R m under the Euclidean metric, we say that A is a Euclidean metric semilattice. Note also that because in a semilattice b a if and only if a _ b = b, a partial order in a metric semilattice is necessarily closed.
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A semilattice A is complete if every nonempty subset S of A has a least upper bound, _S;
in A: A metric semilattice A is locally complete if for every a 2 A and every neighborhood 13 Hence, is transitive (a b and b c imply a c); re ‡exive (a a); and antisymmetric (a b and b a imply a = b):
14 Recall that A A is the smallest sigma algebra containing all sets of the form B C with B; C in A: 15 Sets without upper bounds are trivially upper-bound-convex. 16 De…ning a semilattice in terms of the join operator, _, rather than the meet operator,^; is entirely a matter of convention. 17 The converse can fail. For example, the set A = f(x; y) 2 R 2 + : x + y = 1g [ f(1; 1)g is a semilattice with the coordinatewise partial order, and this order is closed under the Euclidean metric. But A is not a metric semilattice because whenever a n 6 = b n and a n ; b n ! a; we have (1; 1) = lim(a n _ b n ) 6 = (lim a n ) _ (lim b n ) = a.
U of a; there is a neighborhood W of a contained in U such that every nonempty subset S of W has a least upper bound, _S; contained in U: Lemma A.18 establishes that a compact metric semilattice A is locally complete if and only if for every a 2 A and every sequence a n ! a; lim m (_ n m a n ) = a:
18 A distinct su¢ cient condition for local completeness is given in Lemma A.20. Lipschitz condition jf (x) f (y)j jx yj ; endowed with the maximum norm kf k = max x jf (x)j ; and partially ordered by
The last example is an in…nite dimensional compact locally-complete metric semilattice.
In general, and unlike compact Euclidean metric semilattices, in…nite dimensional metric semilattices need not be locally complete even if compact and convex.
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Finally, if a; b; and c are members of a partially ordered set, we say that b lies between a and c if a b c:
A Class of Bayesian Games
There are N players, i = 1; 2; :::; N: Player i's type space is T i and his action space is A i ;
and both are nonempty and partially ordered. Unless a notational distinction is helpful, all partial orders, although possibly distinct, will be denoted by : Player i's payo¤ function is
For each player i; T i is a sigma-algebra of subsets of T i ; and members of T i will often be referred to simply as measurable sets. The common prior over the players'types is a countably additive probability measure de…ned on T 1 ::: T N : Let G denote this Bayesian game.
We shall make use of the following additional assumptions, where i denotes the marginal of on T i : Hence, the domain of i is T i : For every player i; G.1 The partial order on T i is measurable.
G.2 The probability measure i on T i is atomless.
G.3
There is a countable subset T 0 i of T i such that every set in T i assigned positive probability by i contains two points between which lies a point in T 0 i : G.4 A i is a compact metric space and a semilattice with a closed partial order. 20 G.5 Either (i) A i is a convex and locally convex topological space and the partial order on A i is convex, or (ii) A i is a locally-complete metric semilattice.
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G.6 u i (a; t) is bounded, jointly measurable, and continuous in a 2 A for every t 2 T:
Assumptions G.1-G.6 strictly generalize the assumptions in Athey (2001) 24 Indeed, suppose a player's action set is the semilattice A = f(1; 0); (1=2; 1=2); (0; 1); (1; 1)g in R 2 ; with the coordinatewise partial order and note that A is not a sublattice of R 2 . It is not di¢ cult to see that this player's set of monotone pure strategies from [0; 1] into A; endowed with the metric d(f; g) = R 1 0 jf (x) g(x)j dx; is homeomorphic to three line segments joined at a common endpoint. Consequently, this strategy set is not homeomorphic to a convex set and so neither Kakutani's nor Glicksberg's theorems can be directly applied. On the other hand, this strategy set is an absolute retract (see Lemma A.16), which is su¢ cient for our approach.
Assumption G.2 is used to establish the contractibility of the players'sets of monotone best replies and in particular to construct an associated contraction that is continuous in a topology in which payo¤s are continuous as well. Milgrom and Weber's (1985) absolute-continuity assumption on the joint distribution over types, it plays the same compactness role for monotone pure strategies as the Milgrom-Weber assumption plays for distributional strategies.
27;28
Assumption G.5 is used in ensuring that the set of monotone pure strategies is an absolute retract and therefore amenable to …xed point analysis.
Assumption G.6 is used to ensure that best replies are well de…ned and that best-reply correspondences are upper-hemicontinuous. Assumption G.6 is trivially satis…ed when action spaces are …nite. Thus, for example, it is possible to consider auctions here by supposing that players'bid spaces are discrete. We do so in section 5.
As functions from types to actions, best replies for any player i are determined only up to i measure zero sets. This leads us to the following de…nitions. A pure strategy for player i is a function, s i : T i ! A i ; that is i -a.e. (almost-everywhere) equal to a measurable function, and is monotone if t
29;30 Let S i denote player 25 Two points in a partially ordered metric space are strictly ordered if they are contained in disjoint open sets such that every point in one set is greater or equal to every point in the other. 26 Indeed, without G.3, a player's type space could be the negative diagonal in [0; 1] 2 endowed with the coordinatewise partial order. But then every measurable function from types to actions would be monotone because no two distinct types are ordered. Compactness in a useful topology is then e¤ectively precluded. 27 To see that even G.2 and G.3 together do not imply the Milgrom and Weber (1985) restriction that is absolutely continuous with respect to the product of its marginals 1 :::
n , note that G.2 and G.3 hold when there are two players, each with unit interval type space, and where types are drawn according to Lebesgue measure conditional on any one of …nitely many positively or negatively sloped lines in the unit square.
28 One might wonder whether G.3 can be weakened by requiring instead merely that every atomless set in T i assigned positive probability by i contains two distinct ordered points. The answer is "no,"in the sense that this weakening permits examples in which every measurable function from [0; 1] into [0; 1] is monotone, precluding compactness of the set of monotone pure strategies in a useful topology. 29 Recall that a property P (t i ) holds i -a.e. if the set of t i for which P (t i ) holds contains a measurable subset having i -measure one.
30 Because under G.4 A i is a metric space, we willl always endow A i with the Borel sigma-algebra. Thus i's set of pure strategies and let S = N i=1 S i : A vector of pure strategies, (ŝ 1 ; :::;ŝ N ) 2 S is an equilibrium if for every player i and every pure strategy s
where the left-hand side, henceforth denoted by U i (ŝ); is player i's payo¤ given the joint strategyŝ; and the right-hand side is his payo¤ when he employs s 0 i and the others emploŷ s i .
It will sometimes be helpful to speak of the payo¤ to player i's type t i from the action a i given the strategies of the others, s i : This payo¤, which we will refer to as i's interim payo¤, is
where i ( jt i ) is a version of the conditional probability on T i given t i : A single such version is …xed for each player i once and for all.
The Main Result
Call a subset of player i's pure strategies join-closed if for any pair of strategies, s i ; s 0 i ; in the subset, the strategy taking the action s i (t i ) _ s 0 i (t i ) for each t i 2 T i is also in the subset. 31 We can now state our main result, whose proof is provided in section 6. Theorem 4.1. If G.1-G.6 hold, and each player's set of monotone pure best replies is nonempty and join-closed whenever the others employ monotone pure strategies, then G possesses a monotone pure strategy equilibrium.
A strengthening of Theorem 4.1 can be helpful when one wishes to demonstrate not merely the existence of a monotone pure strategy equilibrium but the existence of a monotone pure strategy equilibrium within a particular subset of strategies. For example, in a uniformprice auction for m units, a strategy mapping a player's m-vector of marginal values into a vector of m bids is undominated only if his bid for a kth unit is no greater than his marginal value for a kth unit. As formulated, Theorem 4.1 does not directly permit one to measurable subsets of A i are the Borel subsets.
31 Note that when the join operator is continuous, as it is in a metric semilattice, the resulting function is a.e.-measurable, being the composition of a.e.-measurable and continuous functions. But even when the join operator is not continuous, because the join of two monotone pure strategies is monotone, it is a.e.-measurable under the hypotheses of Lemma A.11. demonstrate the existence of an undominated equilibrium. 32 The next result takes care of this. Its proof is a straightforward extension of the proof of Theorem 4.1, and is provided in Remark 8.
A subset of player i's pure strategies is called pointwise-limit-closed if whenever s 1 i ; s 2 i ; ::: are each in the set and s n i (t i ) ! n s i (t i ) for i almost-every t i 2 T i ; then s i is also in the set. A subset of player i's pure strategies is called piecewise-closed if whenever s i and s 0 i are in the set, then so is any strategy s 00 i such that for every t i 2 T i either s
Theorem 4.2. Under the hypotheses of Theorem 4.1, if for each player i; C i is a join-closed, piecewise-closed and pointwise-limit-closed subset of pure strategies containing at least one monotone pure strategy, and the intersection of C i with i's set of monotone pure best replies is nonempty whenever every other player j employs a monotone pure strategy in C j , then G possesses a monotone pure strategy equilibrium in which each player i's pure strategy is in
Remark 1. When player i's action space is a semilattice with a closed partial order (as implied by G.4) and C i is de…ned by any collection of weak inequalities, i.e., if F i and G i are arbitrary collections of measurable functions from T i into A i and
e. t i 2 T i g; then C i is join-closed, piecewise-closed and pointwise-limit-closed.
The next section provides conditions that are su¢ cient for the hypotheses of Theorem 4.1.
Su¢ cient Conditions
Both Athey (2001) and McAdams (2003) , within the con…nes of a lattice, make use of quasisupermodularity and single-crossing conditions on interim payo¤s. We now provide weaker versions of both of these conditions, as well as single condition that is weaker than their combination.
Suppose that player i's action space, A i ; is a lattice. We say that player i's interim payo¤ function V i is weakly quasisupermodular if for all monotone pure strategies s i of the others, all a i ; a 0 i 2 A i ; and every t i 2 T i ;
32 Note that it is not possible to restrict the action space alone to ensure that the player chooses an undominated strategy since the bids that he must be permitted to choose will depend upon his private type, i.e., his vector of marginal values. McAdams (2003) imposes the stronger assumption of quasisupermodularity -due to Milgrom and Shannon (1994) -which requires, in addition, that the second inequality must be strict if the …rst happens to be strict. 33 It is well-known that V i is supermodular in actions -hence weakly quasisupermodular -when the coordinates of a player's own action vector are complementary, i.e., when A i = [0; 1] K is endowed with the coordinatewise partial order and the second cross-partial derivatives of V i (a i1 ; :::; a iK ; t i ; s i ) with respect distinct action coordinates are nonnegative.
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We say that i's interim payo¤ function V i satis…es weak single-crossing if for all monotone pure strategies s i of the others, for all player i action pairs a 0 i a i ; and for all player i type
Athey (2001) and McAdams (2003) assume that V i satis…es the slightly more stringent single-crossing condition in which, in addition to the above, the second inequality is strict whenever the …rst one is. 35 We next present a condition that will be shown to be weaker than the combination of weak quasisupermodularity and weak single-crossing.
Return now to the case in which A i is merely a semilattice. For any joint pure strategy of the others, player i's interim best reply correspondence is a mapping from his type into the set of optimal actions -or interim best replies -for that type. Say that player i's interim best reply correspondence is monotone if for every monotone joint pure strategy of the others, whenever action a i is optimal for player i when his type is t i ; and a 0 i is optimal when his type is t 0 i t i ; then a i _ a 0 i is optimal when his type is t 0 i :
36
The following result relates the above conditions to the hypotheses of Theorem 4.1. (2001), interim payo¤s are automatically supermodular, and hence both quasisupermodular and weakly quasisupermodular. 34 Complementarities between the actions of distinct players is not implied. This is useful because, for example, many auction games satisfy only own-action complementarity. 35 For conditions on the joint distribution of types, ; and the players'payo¤ functions, u i (a; t); that imply the more stringent condition, see Athey (2001, pp.879-81) , McAdams (2003 McAdams ( , p.1197 and Van Zandt and Vives (2005) .
36 This is strictly weaker than requiring the interim best reply correspondence to be increasing in the strong set order, which in any case requires the additional structure of a lattice (see Milgrom and Shannon (1994) ).
37 Which of the three conditions is satis…ed is permitted to depend both on the player, i; and on the joint pure strategy employed by the others.
1. Player i's action space is a lattice and i's interim payo¤ function is weakly quasisupermodular and satis…es weak single-crossing.
2. Player i's interim best reply correspondence is nonempty-valued and monotone.
3. Player i's set of monotone pure strategy best replies is nonempty and join-closed.
Furthermore, the three conditions are in increasing order of generality, i.e., 1 =) 2 =) 3:
Proof. Because, under G.1-G.6, the hypotheses of Theorem 4.1 hold if condition 3 holds for each player i; it su¢ ces to show that 1 =) 2 =) 3: So, …x some player i and some monotone pure strategy for every player but i for the remainder of the proof.
(1 =) 2): Suppose i's action space is a lattice. By G.4 and G.6, for each of i's types, his interim payo¤ function is continuous on his compact action space. Player i therefore possesses an optimal action for each of his types and so his interim best reply correspondence is nonempty-valued. Suppose that action a i is optimal for i when his type is t i and a 0 i is optimal when his type is t 0 i t i : Then because a i^a 0 i is no better than a i when i's type is t i ; weak quasisupermodularity implies that a i _ a 
i in the de…nition of a monotone correspondence). Consequently, B i (t i ) is a subsemilattice of i's action space for each t i and therefore i's set of monotone pure strategy best replies is join-closed (measurability of the pointwise join of two strategies follows as in footnote 31). It remains to show that i's set of monotone pure best replies is nonempty.
; which is well-de…ned because G.4 and Lemma A.6 imply that A i is a complete semilattice. Because i's interim payo¤ function is continuous in his action,
by Lemma A.6. Therefore, a i (t i ) is a member of B i (t i ) implying that a i (t i ) is optimal for every t i : It remains only to show that a i (t i ) is monotone (measurability in t i can be ensured by Lemma A.11).
So, suppose that t We now turn to several applications of our results. Multi-unit uniform-price auctions always have trivial equilibria in weakly dominated strategies in which some player always bids very high on all units and all others always 38 The tie-breaking rule is as follows. Bidders are ordered randomly and uniformly. Then, one bidder at a time according to this order, each bidder's total remaining demand (i.e., his number of bids equal to p); or as much as possible, is …lled at price p per unit until supply is exhausted. 39 It is possible to permit a bidder's total demand to be stochastic in the sense that, for each k > 1; his marginal value for a kth and higher unit may be zero with positive probability, as might occur if a bidder's endowment of the good were private information. We will not pursue this here. bid zero. We wish to establish the existence of monotone pure strategy equilibria that are not trivial in this sense. But observe that, because the set of feasible bids is …nite, bidding above one's marginal value on some unit need not be weakly dominated. Indeed, it might be a strict best reply for bidder i of type t i to bid b k > t ik for a kth unit so long as no feasible bid is in [t ik ; b k ). Such a kth unit-bid might permit bidder i to win a kth unit and earn a surplus with high probability rather than risk losing the unit by bidding below t ik . On the other hand, in this instance there is never any gain, and there might be a loss, from bidding above b k on a kth unit.
Call a monotone pure strategy equilibrium nontrivial if for each bidder i; for f i almostevery t i ; and for every k; bidder i's kth unit-bid does not exceed the smallest feasible bid greater than or equal to t ik : As shown by McAdams (2006) , under the coordinatewise partial order on type and action spaces, nontrivial monotone pure strategy equilibria need not exist when bidders are risk averse, as we permit here. Nonetheless, we will demonstrate that a nontrivial monotone pure strategy equilibrium does exist under an economically motivated partial order on type spaces that di¤ers from the coordinatewise partial order; we maintain the coordinatewise partial order the action space B m of m-vectors of unit-bids.
Before introducing the new partial order, it is instructive to see what goes wrong with the coordinatewise partial order on types. The heart of the matter is that single-crossing fails. To see why, it is enough to consider the case of two units. Fix monotone pure strategies for the other bidders and consider two bids for bidder i, b = ( b 1 ; b 2 ) and b = (b 1 ; b 2 ); where
Suppose that when bidder i employs the high bid, b; he is certain to win both units and pay p for each, while he is certain to win only one unit when he employs the low bid, b: Further, suppose that the low bid yields a price for the one unit he wins that is either p or p 0 > p; each being equally likely. Thus, the expected di¤erence in his payo¤ from employing the high bid versus the low one can be written as,
Single-crossing requires this di¤erence, when nonnegative, to remain nonnegative when bidder i's type increases according to the coordinatewise partial order, i.e., when t i1 and t i2 increase. But this can fail when risk aversion is strict because, whenever t i1 + t i2 2 p > t i1 p 0 ;
the …rst utility di¤erence above strictly falls when t i1 increases. Consequently, the expected di¤erence can become negative if the second utility di¤erence is negative to start with.
The economic intuition for the failure of single-crossing is straightforward. Under risk aversion, the marginal utility of winning a second unit falls when the dollar value of a …rst unit rises, giving the bidder an incentive to reduce his second unit bid so as to reduce the price paid on the …rst unit. We now turn to the new partial order, which ensures that a higher type is associated with a higher marginal utility of winning each additional unit.
For each bidder i; Under the Euclidean metric and Borel sigma-algebra on the type space, the partial order i de…ned by (5.1) is clearly closed so that G.1 is satis…ed. Because the marginal distribution of each player's type has a density, G.2 is satis…ed as well. To see that G.3 is satis…ed, let T 0 i be the set of points in T i with rational coordinates and suppose that 
where we may assume without loss that > 0: But then, t 0 i1 t i1 = (1 + i ) > 0 and for k 2 f2; :::; mg;
Consequently, for any t
according to the partial order i de…ned by (5.1). Hence, G.3 is satis…ed.
As noted in section 4.1, actions spaces, being …nite sublattices, are locally complete compact metric semilattices. Hence, G.4 and G.5 (ii) hold. Also, G.6 holds because action spaces are …nite. Thus, we have so far veri…ed G.1-G.6.
McAdams (2004) 
Assuming that t 0 i i t i in the sense of (5.1), it su¢ ces to show that (5.2) is weakly greater at t 0 i than at t i : Noting that (5.1) implies that t 0 il t il for every l; it can be seen that, if j = k; then (5.2), being negative, is weakly greater at t 0 i than at t i by the concavity of u i . It therefore remains only to consider the case in which j < k; where we have,
where the …rst and fourth inequalities follow from the concavity of u i and because a bidder's surplus lies between m and m; and the third inequality follows because t 0 i i t i in the sense of (5.1). We conclude that weak single crossing holds and so the hypotheses of Theorem 4.1 are satis…ed.
Finally, for each player i, let C i denote the subset of his pure strategies such that for f i almost-every t i ; and for every k; bidder i's kth unit-bid does not exceed (t ik ), the smallest feasible unit-bid greater than or equal to t ik . By Remark 1, each C i is join-closed, piecewiseclosed and pointwise-limit-closed. Further, because the hypotheses of Theorem 4.1 are satis…ed, whenever the others employ monotone pure strategies player i has a monotone best reply, are satis…ed and we conclude that a nontrivial monotone pure strategy equilibrium exists.
We may therefore state the following proposition.
Proposition 5.1. Consider an independent private value uniform-price multi-unit auction with the random-bidder-order tie-breaking rule and in which bids are restricted to a …nite grid. Suppose that each bidder i's vector of marginal values is decreasing and chosen according to the density f i , and that each bidder is weakly risk averse.
Then, there is a pure strategy equilibrium of the auction with the following properties.
For each bidder i; (i) the equilibrium is monotone under the type-space partial order i de…ned by (5.1) and under the usual coordinatewise partial order on bids, and (ii) the equilibrium is nontrivial in the sense that for f i almost-all of his types, and for every k; bidder i's kth unit-bid does not exceed the smallest feasible unit-bid greater than or equal to his marginal value for a kth unit. Remark 4. The partial order de…ned by (5.1) can instead be thought of as a change of variable from t i to say x i ; where x i1 = t i1 and x ik = t ik i (t i1 + ::: + t ik 1 ) for k > 1; and where the coordinatewise partial order is applied to the new type space. Our results apply equally well using this change-of-variable technique. In contrast, McAdams (2003) still does not apply because the resulting type space is not the product of intervals, an assumption he maintains together with a strictly positive joint density.
40 See Figure 5 .2 for the case in which m = 2.
Remark 5. One can use the above technique to obtain the existence of a nontrivial monotone pure strategy equilibrium when bidders'types remain independent but their payo¤s are interdependent. For example, one can permit u i ( P k j=1 v ij (t ij ; t i ) kp) to be bidder i's ex-post utility of winning k units at price p when the joint type vector is t and where bidder i's dollar value for a jth unit, v ij (t ij ; t i ), is strictly increasing in the jth coordinate of i's type vector and can depend in any way on all coordinates of the other bidders'type vectors.
Finally, by considering …ner and …ner …nite grids of bids, one can permit unit-bids to be any nonnegative real number. The proof of the following corollary of Proposition 5.1 is in the appendix.
Corollary 5.2. The conclusions of Proposition 5.1 remain valid even when the bidders' unit-bids are permitted to be any nonnegative real number.
Discriminatory Multi-Unit Auctions with CARA Bidders
Consider the same setup as in Subsection 5.1 with two exceptions. First, change the payment rule so that each bidder pays his kth unit-bid for a kth unit won. Second, assume that each bidder's utility function, u i ; exhibits constant absolute risk aversion.
Despite these two changes, single-crossing still fails under the coordinatewise partial order on types for the same underlying reason as in a uniform-price auction with risk averse bidders.
Nonetheless, just as in the previous section it can be shown here that assumptions G.1-G.6 hold and each bidder i's interim expected payo¤ function satis…es weak single-crossing under the partial order i ; de…ned in (5.1).
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For the remainder of this section, we employ the type-space partial order i ; de…ned in (5.1) and the coordinatewise partial order on the space of feasible bid vectors. Monotonicity of pure strategies is then de…ned in terms of these partial orders.
If it can be shown that interim expected payo¤s are quasisupermodular, condition 1 of Proposition 4.3 would permit us to apply Theorem 4.1. However, quasisupermodularity does not hold in discriminatory auctions with strictly risk averse bidders -even CARA bidders.
The intuition for the failure of quasisupermodularity is as follows. Suppose there are two units, and let b k denote a kth unit-bid. Fixing b 2 ; suppose that b 1 is chosen to maximize a bidder's interim payo¤ when his type is (t 1 ; t 2 ), namely,
where P k (b k ) is the probability of winning at least k units:
There are two bene…ts from increasing b 1 . First, the probability, P 1 (b 1 ); of winning at least one unit increases. Second, when risk aversion is strict, the marginal utility, u((t 1 b 1 ) + (t 2 b 2 )) u(t 1 b 1 ); of winning a second unit increases. The cost of increasing b 1 is that the marginal utility, u(t 1 b 1 ) u(0), of winning a …rst unit decreases. Optimizing over the choice of b 1 balances this cost with the two bene…ts. For simplicity, suppose that the optimal choice of b 1 satis…es b 1 > t 2 :
Now suppose that b 2 increases. Indeed, suppose that b 2 increases to t 2 : Then the marginal utility of winning a second unit vanishes. Consequently, the second bene…t from increasing b 1 is no longer present and the optimal choice of b 1 may fall -even with CARA utility.
This illustrates that the change in utility from increasing one's …rst unit-bid may be positive when one's second unit-bid is low, but negative when one's second unit-bid is high.
Thus, the di¤erent coordinates of a bidder's bid are not necessarily complementary, and weak quasisupermodularity can fail. We therefore cannot appeal to condition 1 of Proposition 4.3.
Fortunately, we can instead appeal to condition 2 of Proposition 4.3 owing to the following lemma, whose proof is in the appendix. It is here where we employ the assumption of CARA utility.
Lemma 5.3. Fix any monotone pure strategies for other bidders and suppose that the vector of bids b i is optimal for bidder i when his type vector is t i ; and that b 0 i is optimal when his type is t Proposition 5.4. Consider an independent private value discriminatory multi-unit auction with the random-bidder-order tie-breaking rule and in which bids are restricted to a …nite grid. Suppose that each bidder i's vector of marginal values is decreasing and chosen according to the density f i , and that each bidder is weakly risk averse and exhibits constant absolute risk aversion.
Then, there is a pure strategy equilibrium that is monotone under the type-space partial order i de…ned by (5.1) and under the usual coordinatewise partial order on bids.
Remark 6. As in Remark 5, similar techniques can be used to obtain the existence of a monotone pure strategy equilibrium when bidders' types remain independent but their payo¤s are interdependent.
The proof of the following corollary is in the appendix. The two applications provided so far demonstrate that it is useful to have ‡exibility in de…ning the partial order on the type space since the mathematically natural partial order (in this case the coordinatewise partial order on the original type space) may not be the partial order that corresponds best to the economics of the problem. The next application shows that even when single crossing cannot be established for all coordinates of the type space jointly, it is enough for the existence of a pure strategy equilibrium if single-crossing holds strictly even for a single coordinate of the type space.
Price Competition with Non-Substitutes
Consider an n-…rm di¤erentiated-product price-competition setting. Firm i chooses price n and when their joint vector of private information about market demand is
Demand functions are assumed to be twice continuously di¤erentiable, strictly positive when own-price is less than one, and strictly downward-sloping, i.e., @D i (p; x)=@p i <
0:
Some products may be substitutes, but others need not be. More precisely, the n …rms are partitioned into two subsets N 1 and N 2 . 42 Products produced by …rms within each subset are substitutes, and so we assume that D i (p; x) and @D i (p; x)=@p i are nondecreasing in p j whenever i and j are in the same N k . In addition, marginal costs are a¢ liated among …rms within each N k and are independent across the two subsets of …rms. The joint density of costs is given by the continuously di¤erentiable density f (c) on [0; 1] n : Information about market demand may be correlated across …rms, but is independent of all marginal costs and has continuously di¤erentiable joint density g(x) on [0; 1] n : We do not assume that market demands are nondecreasing in x because we wish to permit the possibility that information that increases demand for some products might decrease it for others.
Given pure strategies p j (c j ; x j ) for the others, …rm i's interim expected pro…ts are,
for all p i ; c i ; x i 2 [0; 1] such that p i c i ; where the weak inequality follows because both partial derivatives with respect to c i on the right-hand side of (5.4) are nonnegative. For example, consider the expectation in the …rst partial derivative (the second is similar). If
The inner expectation is nondecreasing in c i because the vector of marginal costs for …rms in N 1 are a¢ liated, their prices are nondecreasing in their costs, and their goods are substitutes.
That the entire expectation is nondecreasing in c i now follows from the independence of
Thus, according to (5. under which a monotone pure strategy equilibrium exists.
Note that, because @D i =@p i is positive and continuous on its compact domain, it is bounded strictly above zero with a bound that is independent of the pure strategies, p j (c j ; x j ) employed by other …rms. Hence, because our continuity assumptions imply that @ 2 v i (p i ; c i ; x i )=@x i @p i is bounded, there exists i > 0 such that for all 2 [0; i ] and all pure strategies p j (c j ; x j ) nondecreasing in c j ;
Inequality (5.6) implies that when p i c i ; the marginal gain from increasing one's price, namely,
is strictly increasing along lines in (c i ; x i )-space with slope 2 [0; i ]: This provides a basis 43 We cannot simply restrict attention to strategies p i (c i ; x i ) that are monotone in c i and jointly measurable in (c i ; x i ) because this set of pure strategies is not compact in a topology rendering ex-ante payo¤s continuous. Also, because the action space [0; 1] is totally ordered, the set of monotone best replies is join-closed because the join of two best replies is, at every t i ; equal to one of them or to the other. Finally, as is shown in the Appendix (see Lemma A.22) , under the type-space partial order, i ; …rm i possesses a monotone best reply when the others employ monotone pure strategies.
Therefore, by Theorem 4.1, there exists a pure strategy equilibrium in which each …rm's price is monotone in (c i ; x i ) according to i : In particular, there is a pure strategy equilibrium in which each …rm's price is nondecreasing in his marginal cost, the coordinate in which strict single-crossing holds.
Type Spaces with Atoms
When type spaces contain atoms, assumption G.2 fails and there may not exist a pure strategy equilibrium, let alone a monotone pure strategy equilibrium. Thus, one must permit mixing and we show here how our results can be used to ensure the existence of a monotone mixed strategy equilibrium.
Because we do not make the Milgrom and Weber (1985) assumption that the joint dis-tribution of types is absolutely continuous with respect to the product of its marginals, it is not useful to de…ne mixed strategies as distributional strategies. For our purposes, the most direct route is to instead follow Aumann (1964) x i : The metrics and partial orders on the players'action spaces are unchanged. 44 A subset of a partially ordered space is totally ordered if any two members are ordered. Such a subset is sometimes also called a chain. 45 For every t i 2 T i ; the singleton set ft i g is in T i by G.1. See Section A.1 in the Appendix. 46 In particular, if for each player i; B i 2 T i and C i is a Borel subset of [0; 1]; and It is straightforward to show that under the hypotheses above, all the hypotheses of Theorem 4.1 but perhaps G.3 hold in the surrogate game. 47 We now show that G.3 too holds in the surrogate game.
For each player i; let T 0 i denote the countable subset of T i that can be used to verify G.3 in the original game and de…ne the countable set Q 
Proof of Theorem 4.1
Let M i denote the nonempty set of monotone functions from T i into A i , and let M = N i=1 M i : By Lemma A:11; every element of M i is equal i almost-everywhere to a measurable monotone function, and so M i coincides with player i's set of monotone pure strategies. Let Observe that a monotone pure strategy in the surrogate game induces a monotone mixed strategy in the original game, and that a monotone pure strategy in the original game de…nes a monotone pure strategy in the surrogate game by viewing it to be constant in x i :
48 For any metric, d( ; ); a topologically equivalent bounded metric is min(1; d( ; )):
on M i as follows: 
establishing the continuity of U i :
Because each M i is compact, Berge's theorem of the maximum implies that 
By Lemma A.12, this partial order is closed. Therefore, Lemma A.6 implies that B i (s i ) is a complete 49 Formally, the resulting metric space (M i ; i ) is the space of equivalence classes of functions in M i that are equal i almost everywhere -i.e., two functions are in the same equivalence class if the set on which they coincide contains a measurable subset having i -measure one. Nevertheless, analogous to the standard treatment of L p spaces, in the interest of notational simplicity we focus on the elements of the original space M i rather than on the equivalence classes themselves. 50 One cannot improve upon Lemma A.16 by proving, for example, that M i ; metrized by i ; is homeomorphic to a convex set. It need not be (e.g., see footnote 24).
51 This is because if Q 1 ; :::; Q n are such that
52 For example, if T i = [0; 1] 2 and i is absolutely continuous with respect to Lebesgue measure, we may take i (t i ) = (t i1 + t i2 )=2:
semilattice so thats i = _B i (s i ) is a well-de…ned member of B i (s i ). Consequently for 
In case (a), < 1 and i (t i ) < 1 n for n large enough and so h( n ; s
n for n large enough and so for such large enough n; h( n ; s n i )(t i ) = s i (t i ) = h( ; s i )(t i ): Because the remaining case (c) occurs only if t i is in a set of types having i -measure zero, we have shown that h( n ; s n i )(t i ) ! h( ; s i )(t i ) for i -a.e. t i ; which, by Lemma A.12 implies that h( n ; s 53 One might wonder why we do not take the more driect route of de…ning, for each t i 2 T i ; s i (t i ) = _s i (t i ), where the join is taken over all s i 2 B i (s i ). It is because one must show using an argument such as that given here that s i is in B i (s i ); which is not obvious by virtue of the direct de…nition alone since each member of B i (s i ) is an interim best reply only i almost everywhere. 54 With i de…ned as in footnote 52, Figure 6 .1 provides snapshots of the resulting h( ; s i ) as moves from zero to one. The axes are the two dimensions of the type vector (t i1 ; t i2 ); and the arrow within the …gures depicts the direction in which the negatively-sloped line, (t i1 + t i2 )=2 = 1 ; moves as increases. For example, panel (a) shows that when = 0; h( ; s i )(t i ) is equal to s i (t i ) for all t i in the unit square. On the other hand, panel (c) shows that when = 3=4; h( ; s i )(t i ) is equal to s i (t i ) for t i below the negatively-sloped line and equal to s i (t i ) for t i above it. (d)) and the domain is the unit square. 
A. Appendix
To simplify the notation, we drop the subscript i from T i ; i ; and A i throughout the appendix. Thus, in this appendix, T; ; and A should be thought of as the type space, marginal distribution, and action space, respectively, of any one of the players, not as the joint type spaces, joint distribution, and joint action spaces of all the players. Of course, the theorems that follow are correct with either interpretation, but in the main text we apply the theorems below to the players individually rather than jointly and so the former interpretation is the more relevant. For convenience, we rewrite here without subscripts the assumptions from section 3.2 that will be used in this appendix.
G.1 T is endowed with a sigma-algebra of subsets, T ; a measurable partial order, and a countably additive probability measure :
G.2 The probability measure is atomless.
G.3
There is a countable subset T 0 of T such that every set in T assigned positive probability by contains two points between which lies a point in T 0 :
G.4 A is a compact metric space and a semilattice with a closed partial order.
G.5 Either (i)
A is a convex subset of a locally convex linear topological space, and the partial order on A is convex, or (ii) A is a locally-complete metric semilattice.
A.1. Partially Ordered Measure Spaces
Preliminaries. We say that = (T; T ; ; ) is a partially ordered probability space if G.1 holds, i.e., if T is a sigma-algebra of subsets of T; is a measurable partial order on T , and is a countably additive probability measure with domain T . If, in addition, G.2 holds, we say that is a partially ordered atomless probability space.
If = (T; T ; ; ) is a partially ordered probability space, Lemma 7.6.1 of Cohn (1980) implies that the sets (t) = ft 0 2 T : t 0 t) and (t) = ft 0 2 T : t t 0 g are in T for each t 2 T: Hence, for all t; t 0 2 T; the interval [t;
tg is a member of T , being the intersection of (t) and (t 0 ). In particular, the singleton set ftg; being a degenerate interval, is a member of T for every t 2 T:
Lemma A.1. Suppose that (T; T ; ; ) is a partially ordered probability space satisfying G.3 and that D 2 T has positive measure under :Then there are sequences, ft n g 
De…ne the sequence ft n g 1 n=1 in T 0 by setting t n =t 3n 2 and de…ne the sequence ft
in D by letting t 0 n be any member of D \ [t 3n 1 ;t 3n ]: The latter set is always nonempty because for every k 1;
where the …rst line follows because D contains D k 1 and the second line follows from the de…nition of D k : Hence the two sequences, ft n g in T 0 and ft 0 n g in D; are well-de…ned. Finally, for every n 1; (A.1) implies ([t n ; t Proof. Let T 0 = ft 1 ; t 2 ; :::g be the countable subset of T in G.3. De…ne : T ! [0; 1] as follows:
Clearly, is monotone and measurable, being the pointwise convergent sum of monotone and measurable functions. It remains to show that ( 1 ( )) = 0 for every 2 [0; 1]: Suppose, by way of contradiction, that ( 1 ( )) > 0: Because is atomless, ( 1 ( )nT 0 ) = ( 1 ( )) > 0 and so applying G.3 to 1 ( )nT 0 yields t 0 ; t 00 in 1 ( )nT 0 and t k 2 T 0 such that t 00
A.2. Semilattices
The standard proofs of the next two lemmas are omitted.
Lemma A.4. If G.4 holds, and a n ; b n ; c n are sequences in A such that a n b n c n for every n and both a n and c n converge to a; then b n converges to a. Proof. Let S be a nonempty subset of A: Because A is a compact metric space, S has a countable dense subset, fa 1 ; a 2 ; :::g: Let a = lim n a 1 _ ::: _ a n ; where the limit exists by Lemma A.5. Suppose that b 2 A is an upper bound for S and let a be an arbitrary element of S: Then, some sequence, a n k ; converges to a: Moreover, a n k a 1 _ a 2 _ ::: _ a n k b for every k: Taking the limit as k ! 1 yields a a b: Hence, a = _S:
A.3. The Space of Monotone Functions from T into A
In this subsection we introduce a metric, ; under which the space M of monotone functions from T into A will be shown to be a compact metric space. Further, it will be shown that under suitable conditions, the metric space (M; ) is an absolute retract. Some preliminary results are required.
Recall that a property P (t) is said to hold for -a.e. t 2 T if the set of t 2 T on which P (t) holds contains a measurable subset having -measure one. We next introduce an important de…nition.
De…nition A.7. Given a partially ordered probability space = (T; T ; ; ) and a partially ordered metric space A; say that a monotone function f : T ! A is quasi-continuous at t 2 T if there are sequences ft n g and ft 0 n g in T such that lim n f (t n ) = lim n f (t 0 n ) = f (t) and the intervals [t n ; t] and [t; t 0 n ] have positive -measure for every n:
Remark 9. (i) The positive measure condition implies that the intervals are nonempty, i.e., that t 0 n t t n for every n: (ii) Because we have not endowed T with a topology, neither ft n g nor ft 0 n g is required to converge. (iii) f is quasi-continuous at every atom t of because we may set t n = t 0 n = t for all n:
Lemma A.8. Suppose that = (T; T ; ; ) is a partially ordered probability space satisfying G.3, that A satis…es G.4, and that f : T ! A is measurable and monotone. Then the set of points at which f is quasi-continuous is measurable.
Proof. Suppose that f is quasi-continuous at t 2 T and that the sequences ft n g and ft 0 n g satisfy the conditions in De…nition A.7. Then, by Corollary A.2, for each n there existt n ;t 0 n in T 0 such that the intervals [t n ;t n ] [t n ; t]; [t;t 0 n ]; and [t 0 n ; t 0 n ] each have positive -measure. In particular, t n t n t implies f (t n ) f (t n ) f (t) and t t 0
We conclude that the de…nition of quasi-continuity at any t 2 T would be unchanged if the sequences ft n g and ft 0 n g were required to be in T 0 : Let d be the metric on A and for every t 1 ; t 2 2 T and every n = 1; 2; :::; de…ne
Then according to the conclusion drawn in the preceding paragraph, the set of points at which f is quasi-continuous is,
Consequently, it su¢ ces to show that each T n t 1 ;t 2 is measurable, and for this it su¢ ces to show that, as functions of t; the functions ([t 1 ; t]); ([t; t 2 ]); d(f (t 1 ); f (t)); and d(f (t 2 ); f (t)) are measurable.
The functions d(f (t 1 ); f (t)) and d(f (t 2 ); f (t)) are measurable in t because the metric d is continuous in its arguments and f is measurable. For the measurability of ([t 1 ; t]); let E = f(t 0 ; t 00 ) 2 T T : t 0 t 00 g \ (T (t 1 )): Then E is in T T by the measurability of ; and [t 1 ; t] = E t is the slice of E in which the …rst coordinate is t: Proposition 5.1.2 of Cohn (1980) states that (E t ) is measurable in t: A similar argument shows that ([t; t 2 ]) is measurable in t:
Lemma A.9. Suppose that G.1, G.3 and G.4 hold, i.e., that = (T; T ; ; ) is a partially ordered probability space satisfying G.3 and that A satis…es G.4. If f : T ! A is measurable and monotone, then f is quasi-continuous at -a.e. t 2 T:
Proof. Let D denote the set of discontinuity points of f: By Lemma A.8, D is a member of T : It su¢ ces to show that (D) = 0:
De…ne T n t 1 ;t 2 as in the proof of Lemma A.8 so that,
and suppose, by way of contradiction, that (D) > 0: Then, for some
Let 
By Lemma A.1, there are sequences, ft n g 1 n=1 in T 0 and ft 0 n g 1 n=1 in D N ; such that assigns positive measure to the intervals [t n ; t 0 n ] and [t 0 n ; t n+1 ] for every n: Consequently, for every n; (A.3) implies that either,
On the other hand, because for every n the intervals [t n ; t ::: . Hence, the monotonicity of f implies that,
2 ) ::: is a monotone sequence of points in A and must therefore converge by Lemma A.5. But then both d(f (t n ); f (t 0 n )) and d(f (t n+1 ); f (t 0 n )) converge to zero, contradicting (A.4), and so we conclude that (D) = 0: Lemma A.10. (A Generalized Helly Selection Theorem). Suppose that G.1, G.3 and G.4 hold, i.e., that = (T; T ; ; ) is a partially ordered probability space satisfying G.3 and that A satis…es G.4. If f n : T ! A is a sequence of monotone functions -not necessarily measurable -then there is a subsequence, f n k ; and a measurable monotone function, f :
Proof. Let T 0 = ft 1 ; t 2 ; :::g be the countable subset of T satisfying G.3. Choose a subsequence, f n k ; of f n such that, for every i; lim k f n k (t i ) exists. De…ne f (t i ) = lim k f n k (t i ) for every i; and extend f to all of T by de…ning f (t) = _fa 2 A : a f (t i ) for all t i tg.
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By Lemma A.6, this is well de…ned because fa 2 A : a f (t i ) for all t i tg is nonempty for each t since it contains any limit point of f n k (t):
Further, as required, the extension to T is monotone and leaves the values of f on ft 1 ; t 2 ; :::g unchanged, where the latter follows because the monotonicity of f on ft 1 ; t 2 ; :::g implies that fa 2 A : a f (t i ) for all t i t k g = fa 2 A : a f (t k )g: To see that f is measurable, note …rst that f (t) = lim m g m (t); where g m (t) = _fa 2 A : a f (t i ) for all i = 1; :::; m such that t i tg, and where the limit exists by Lemma A.5. Because the partial order on T is measurable, each g m is a measurable simple function. Hence, f is measurable, being the pointwise limit of measurable functions.
Let f be quasi-continuous at t 2 T: By Lemma A.9, it su¢ ces to show that f n k (t) ! f (t): So, suppose that f n k j (t) ! a 2 A for some subsequence n k j of n k : By the compactness of A; it su¢ ces to show that a = f (t):
Because f is quasi-continuous at t 2 T; the argument in the …rst paragraph of the proof of Lemma A.8 implies that there exist sequences ft in g and ft so t in t t 0 in , implying by the monotonicity of each f n k that,
for every k and n: Because the partial order on A is closed, taking the limit …rst in k yields,
and taking the limit next in n yields f (t) a f (t); from which we conclude that a = f (t); as desired.
By setting ff n g in Lemma A.10 equal to a constant sequence, we obtain the following.
Lemma A.11. Under G.1, G.3 and G.4, every monotone function from T into A is almost everywhere equal to a measurable monotone function.
We now introduce a metric on M; the space of monotone functions from T into A. Denote the metric on A by d and assume without loss that d(a; b) 1 for all a; b 2 A: De…ne the metric, ; on M by
which is well-de…ned by Lemma A.11.
Formally, the resulting metric space (M; ) is the space of equivalence classes of monotone functions that are equal almost everywhere -i.e., two functions are in the same equivalence class if there is a measurable subset of T having -measure one on which they coincide. Nevertheless, and analogous to the standard treatment of L p spaces, we focus on the elements of the original space M rather than on the equivalence classes themselves.
Lemma A.12. Under G.1, G.3 and G.4 
Proof. (only if) Suppose that (f k ; f ) ! 0: By Lemma A.9, it su¢ ces to show that f k (t) ! f (t) for all quasi-continuity points, t; of f: Let t 0 be a quasi-continuity point of f: Because A is compact, it su¢ ces to show that an arbitrary convergent subsequence, f k j (t 0 ); of f k (t 0 ) converges to f (t 0 ). So, suppose that f k j (t 0 ) converges to a 2 A: By Lemma A.10, there is a further subsequence, f k 0 j of f k j and a monotone measurable function, g :
Because d is bounded, the dominated convergence theorem implies that (f k 0 j ; g) ! 0: But (f k 0 j ; f ) ! 0 then implies that (f; g) = 0 and so f k 0 j (t) ! f (t) for a.e. t in T: Because t 0 is a quasi-continuity point of f; there are sequences ft n g 1 n=1 and ft 0 n g 1 n=1 in T such that lim n f (t n ) = lim n f (t 0 n ) = f (t 0 ) and the intervals [t n ; t 0 ] and [t 0 ; t 0 n ] have positive -measure for every n 1:
Consequently, because f k 0 j (t) ! f (t) for a.e. t in T and because the intervals [t n ; t 0 ] and [t 0 ; t 0 n ] have positive -measure, for every n there existt n andt 0 n such that t n t n t 0 t 0
Taking the limit of the latter inequality as n ! 1 yields f (t 0 ) a f (t 0 ); so that a = f (t 0 ); as desired.
(if) To complete the proof, suppose that f k (t) converges to f (t) for -a.e. t 2 T: Then, because d is bounded, the dominated convergence theorem implies that (f k ; f ) ! 0:
Combining Lemmas A.10 and A.12 we obtain the following.
Lemma A.13. Under G.1, G.3 and G.4, the metric space (M; ) is compact.
Lemma A.14. Suppose that G.1, G.3 and G.4 hold and f : T ! A is monotone. If for every t 2 T; f (t) = _g(t); where the join is taken over all monotone g : T ! A s.t. g(t) f (t) for -a.e. t 2 T; then f : T ! A is monotone and f (t) = f (t) for -a.e. t 2 T:
56
Proof. Note that f (t) is well-de…ned for each t 2 T by Lemma A.6, and f is monotone, being the pointwise join of monotone functions. It remains only to show that f (t) = f (t) for -a.e. t 2 T: Suppose …rst that f is measurable. Let C denote the measurable (by Lemma A.8) set of quasi-continuity points of f; and let L f denote the set of monotone g : T ! A such that g(t) f (t) for -a.e. t 2 T: By Lemma A.9, (C) = 1:
We claim that f (t) g(t) for every t 2 C and every g 2 L f : To see this, …x g 2 L f and let D be a measurable set with -measure one such that g(t) f (t) for every t 2 D: Consider t 2 C: Because t is a quasi-continuity point of f; there are sequences ft n g and ft 0 n g in T such that lim n f (t n ) = lim n f (t 0 n ) = f (t) and such that the intervals [t n ; t] and [t; t 
; for all n: In particular, f (t 0 n ) g(t) for all n; so that f (t) = lim n f (t 0 n ) g(t); proving the claim. Consequently, f (t) _ g2L f g(t) for every t 2 C: Hence, because f itself is a member of L f ; f (t) = _ g2L f g(t) = f (t) for every t 2 C and therefore for -a.e. t 2 T:
If f is not measurable, then by Lemma A.11, we may repeat the argument replacing f with a measurable and monotonef : T ! A that is -almost-everywhere equal to f; concluding thatf (t) = _ g2Lf g(t) for -a.e. t 2 T: But L f = Lf then implies that for -a.e. 
Proof. Suppose that ( k ; f k ; g k ) ! ( ; f; g) 2 [0; 1] M M: By Lemma A.12, there is a -measure one subset, D; of T such that f k (t) ! f (t) and g k (t) ! g(t) for every t 2 D: There are three cases: = 1=2, > 1=2 and < 1=2: 56 It can be further shown that, for all t 2 T; f (t) = _fa 2 A : a f (t 0 ) for all t 0 t s.t. t 0 2 T is a quasi-continuity point of f g: But we will not need this result.
Suppose that < 1=2: For each t 2 D such that (t) < j1 2 j ; we have (t) < j1 2 k j for all k large enough. Hence, h( k ; f k ; g k )(t) = f k (t) for all k large enough, and so h( k ; f k ; g k )(t) = f k (t) ! f (t) = h( ; f; g)(t): Similarly, for each t 2 D such that
= h( ; f; g)(t); where the limit follows because _ is continuous. Because (ft 2 T : (t) = j1 2 jg) = 0; we have therefore shown that if < 1=2; then h( k ; f k ; g k )(t) ! h( ; f; g)(t) for a.e. t 2 T and so, by Lemma A.12, h( k ; f k ; g k ) ! h( ; f; g):
Because the case > 1=2 is similar to < 1=2; we consider only the remaining case in which = 1=2: In this case, j1 2 k j ! 0: Consequently, for any t 2 T such that (t) > 0; we have h( k ; f k ; g k )(t) = f k (t) _ g k (t) for k large enough and so h( k ; f k ; g k )(t) = f k (t) _ g k (t) ! f (t) _ g(t) = h(1=2; f; g)(t): Hence, because (ft 2 T : (t) = 0g) = 0, we have shown that h( k ; f k ; g k )(t) ! h(1=2; f; g)(t) for a.e. t 2 T , and so again by Lemma A.12, h( k ; f k ; g k ) ! h( ; f; g):
Lemma A.16. Under G.1-G.5, the metric space (M; ) is an absolute retract.
Proof. De…ne h : [0; 1] M M ! M by h( ; s; s 0 )(t) = s(t) + (1 )s 0 (t) for all t 2 T if G.5(i) holds, and by (A.5) if G.5(ii) holds, where the monotone function ( ) appearing in (A.5) is de…ned by (A.2) . Note that h maps into M in case G.5(i) holds because A is convex (which itself follows because the partial order on A is convex). We claim that, in each case, h is continuous. Indeed, if G.5(ii) holds, the continuity of h follows from Lemmas A.3 and A.15. If G.5(i) holds and the sequence ( n ; s n ; s 0 n ) 2 [0; 1] M M converges to ( ; s; s 0 ); then by Lemma A.12, s n (t) ! s(t) and s 0 n (t) ! s 0 (t) for -a.e. t 2 T: Hence, because A is a convex topological space, n s n (t) + (1 n )s 0 n (t) ! s(t) + (1 )s 0 (t) for -a.e. t 2 T: But then Lemma A.12 implies n s n + (1 n )s 0 n ! s + (1 )s 0 ; as desired. One consequence of the continuity of h is that for any g 2 M; h( ; ; g) is a contraction for M so that (M; ) is contractible. Hence, by Borsuk (1966, IV (9.1) ) and Dugundji (1965) , it su¢ ces to show that for each f 0 2 M and each neighborhood U of f 0 ; there is a neighborhood V of f 0 and contained in U such that the sets V n ; n 1; de…ned inductively by
; are all contained in U: We shall establish this by way of contradiction. Speci…cally, let us suppose to the contrary that for some neighborhood U of f 0 2 M there is no open set V containing f 0 and contained in U such that all the V n as de…ned above are contained in U: In particular, for each k = 1; 2; :::; taking V to be B 1=k (f 0 ); the 1=k ball around f 0 , there exists n k such that some g k 2 V n k is not in U: We derive a contradiction separately for each of the two cases, G.5(i) and G.5(ii).
Case I. Suppose G.5(i) holds. For each n; V n+1 coV; so that for every k = 1; 2; :::; g k 2 V summing to one such that
for -a.e. t 2 T and so for all t in some measurable set E having -measure one. Moreover, the sequence f (t); ::: converges to f 0 (t) for -a.e. t 2 T and so for all t in some measurable set D having -measure one. But then for each t 2 D \ E and every convex neighborhood W t of f 0 (t); each of f k 1 (t); :::; f k n k (t) is in W t for all k large enough, and therefore g k (t) = P n k j=1 k j f k j (t) is in W t for k large enough as well. But this implies, by the local convexity of A; that g k (t) ! f 0 (t) for every t 2 D \ E and hence for -a.e. t 2 T: Lemma A.12 then implies that g k ! f 0 ; contradicting that no g k is in U . Case II. Suppose G.5(ii) holds. As a matter of notation, for f; g 2 M; write f g if f (t) g(t) for -a.e. t 2 T . Also, for any sequence of monotone functions f 1 ; f 2 ; :::; in M; denote by f 1 _ f 2 _ ::: the monotone function taking the value lim n [f 1 (t) _ f 2 (t) _ ::: _ f n (t)] for each t in T: This is well-de…ned by Lemma A.5.
If g 2 V 1 ; then g = h( ; f 0 ; f 1 ) for some 2 [0; 1] and some f 0 ; f 1 2 V: Hence, by the de…nition of h; we have g f 0 _ f 1 and either f 0 g or f 1 g: We may choose the indices so that f 0 g f 0 _ f 1 : Inductively, it can similarly be seen that if g 2 V n ; then there exist f 0 ; f 1 ; :::; f n 2 V such that f 0 g f 0 _ ::: _ f n : (A.6) Hence, for each k = 1; 2; :: , g k 2 V n k and (A.6) imply that there exist f k 0 ; :::; f
Consider the sequence f ; ::: . Because f k j is in B 1=k (f 0 ); this sequence converges to f 0 : Let us reindex this sequence as f 1 ; f 2 ; ::: . Hence, f j ! f 0 : Because for every n the set ff n ; f n+1 ; :::g contains the set ff k 0 ; :::; f k n k g whenever k is large enough, we have f
for every n and all large enough k. Combined with (A.7), this implies that
for every n and all large enough k.
for -a.e. t 2 T . Consequently, if for -a.e. t 2 T; _ j n f j (t) ! f 0 (t) as n ! 1; then (A.8) and Lemma A.4 would imply that g k (t) ! f 0 (t) for -a.e. t 2 T . Then, Lemma A.12 would imply that g k ! f 0 contradicting that no g k is in U; and completing the proof. It therefore remains only to establish that for a.e. t 2 T; _ j n f j (t) ! f 0 (t) as n ! 1: But, by Lemma A.18, because A is locally complete this will follow if f j (t) ! j f 0 (t) for a.e. t; which follows from Lemma A.12 because f j ! f 0 :
A.4. Locally Complete Metric Semilattices
Lemma A.17. If A is a compact upper-bound-convex subset of Euclidean space and a semilattice under the coordinatewise partial order, then A is a metric semilattice, i.e., _ is continuous.
Proof. Suppose that a n ! a, b n ! b; a _ b = c; and a n _ b n ! d; where all of these points are in A: We must show that c = d: Because a n a n _ b n ; taking limits implies a d: Similarly, b d; so that c = a _ b d: Thus, it remains only to show that c d:
Let a = _A denote the largest element of A; which is well de…ned by Lemma A.6. By the upper-bound-convexity of A; " a+(1 ")c 2 A for every " 2 [0; 1]: Because the coordinatewise partial order is closed, it su¢ ces to show that " a + (1 ")c d for every " > 0 su¢ ciently small. So, …x " 2 (0; 1) and consider the kth coordinate, c k ; of c: If for some n; a kn > c k ; then because a k a kn we have a k > c k and therefore " a k + (1 ")c k > c k : Consequently, because a kn ! n a k c k ; we have " a k + (1 ")c k > a kn for all n su¢ ciently large. On the other hand, suppose that a kn c k for all n: Then because a k c k we have " a k + (1 ")c k a kn for all n: So, in either case " a k + (1 ")c k a kn for all n su¢ ciently large. Therefore, because k is arbitrary, " a + (1 ")c a n for all n su¢ ciently large. Similarly, " a + (1 ")c b n for all n su¢ ciently large. Therefore, because " a + (1 ")c 2 A; " a + (1 ")c a n _ b n for all n su¢ ciently large: Taking limits in n gives " a + (1 ")c d:
Lemma A.18. If G.3 holds, then A is locally complete if and only if for every a 2 A and every sequence a n converging to a; lim n (_ k n a k ) = a:
Proof. We …rst demonstrate the "only if" direction. Suppose that A is locally complete, that U is a neighborhood of a 2 A; and that a n ! a: By local completeness, there is a neighborhood W of a contained in U such that every subset of W has a least upper bound in U: In particular, because for n large enough fa n ; a n+1 ; :::g is a subset of W; the least upper bound of fa n ; a n+1 ; :::g; namely _ k n a k ; is in U for n large enough. Since U was arbitrary, this implies lim n (_ k n a k ) = a:
We now turn to the "if" direction. Fix any a 2 A; and let B 1=n (a) denote the open ball around a with radius 1=n: For each n; _B 1=n (a) is well-de…ned by Lemma A.6. Moreover, because _B 1=n (a) is nonincreasing in n; lim n _B 1=n (a) exists by Lemma A.5. We …rst argue that lim n _B 1=n (a) = a: For each n; construct as in the proof of Lemma A.6 a sequence fa n;m g of points in B 1=n (a) such that lim m (a n;1 _ ::: _ a n;m ) = _B 1=n (a): We may therefore choose m n su¢ ciently large so that the distance between a n;1 _ ::: _ a n;mn and _B 1=n (a) is less than 1=n: Consider now the sequence fa 1;1 ; :::; a 1;m 1 ; a 2;1 ; :::; a 2;m 2 ; a 3;1 ; :::; a 3;m 3 ; :::g: Because a n;m is in B 1=n (a); this sequence converges to a: Consequently, by hypothesis, lim n (a n;1 _ ::: _ a n;mn _ a (n+1);1 _ ::: _ a (n+1);m (n+1) _ :::) = a:
But because every a k;j in the join in parentheses on the left-hand side above (denote this join by b n ) is in B 1=n (a); we have a n;1 _ ::: _ a n;mn b n _B 1=n (a):
Therefore, because for every n the distance between a n;1 _ ::: _ a n;mn and _B 1=n (a) is less than 1=n; Lemma A.4 implies that lim n _B 1=n (a) = lim n b n : But since lim n b n = a; we have lim n _B 1=n (a) = a. Next, for each n; let S n be an arbitrary nonempty subset of B 1=n (a); and choose any s n 2 S n : Then s n _S n _B 1=n (a): Because s n 2 B 1=n (a); Lemma A.4 implies that lim n _S n = a: Consequently, for every neighborhood U of a; there exists n large enough such that _S (well-de…ned by Lemma A.6) is in U for every subset S of B 1=n (a): Since a was arbitrary, A is locally complete.
Lemma A.19. Every compact Euclidean metric semilattice is locally complete.
Proof. Suppose that a n ! a with every a n and a in the semilattice, which we assume to be a subset of R K . By Lemma A.18, it su¢ ces to show that lim n (_ k n a k ) = a: By Lemma A.5, lim n (_ k n a k ) exists and is equal to lim n lim m (a n _ ::: _ a m ) since a n _ ::: _ a m is nondecreasing in m; and lim m (a n _ ::: _ a m ) is nonincreasing in n: For each dimension k = 1; :::; K; let a k n;m denote the …rst among a n ; a n+1 ; :::; a m with the largest kth coordinate. Hence, a n _:::_a m = a 1 n;m _:::_a K n;m ; where the right-hand side consists of K terms. Because a n ! a, lim m a k n;m exists for each k and n; and lim n lim m a k n;m = a for each k: Consequently, lim n lim m (a n _:::_a m ) = lim n lim m (a Proof. Suppose that a n ! a: By Lemma A.18, it su¢ ces to show that lim n (_ k n a k ) = a: For every n and m; a m a m _ a m+1 _ ::: _ a m+n , and so taking the limit …rst as n ! 1 and then as m ! 1 gives a lim m _ k m a k ; where the limit in n exists by Lemma A.5 because the sequence is monotone. Hence, it su¢ ces to show that lim m _ k m a k a. Let U be a neighborhood of a and let a 0 be chosen as in the statement of the lemma. Then, because a m ! a; a m a 0 for all m large enough. Consequently, for m large enough and for all n, a m _ a m+1 _ ::: _ a m+n a 0 : Taking the limit …rst in n and then in m yields lim m _ k m a k a 0 : Because for every neighborhood U of a this holds for some a 0 in U; lim m _ k m a k a; as desired.
A.5. Assumption G.3
Say that two points in a partially ordered metric space are strictly ordered if they are contained in disjoint open sets and every member of one set is greater or equal to every member of the other. The following lemma provides a su¢ cient condition for G.3 to hold when T happens to be a separable metric space.
Lemma A.21. Suppose that (T; T ; ; ) is a partially ordered probability space, that T is a separable metric space and that T contains the open sets. Then G.3 holds if every atomless set having positive -measure contains two strictly ordered points.
Proof. Let T 0 be the union of a countable dense subset of T and the countable set of atoms of ; and suppose that D 2 T has positive -measure. We must show that t 1 t Reny (1999) establishes that if this game is better-reply secure, then the limit of a convergent sequence of pure strategy "-equilibria, as " tends to zero, is a pure strategy equilibrium. Hence, in view of Lemma A.13, it su¢ ces to show that the auction game is better-reply secure (when players employ monotone pure strategies) and that it possesses, for every " > 0; an "-equilibrium in monotone pure strategies. An argument analogous to that given in the …rst paragraph on p. 1046 of Reny (1999) shows that the uniform-price auction game with unit-bid space [0; 1] is better-reply secure when bidders employ monotone pure strategies. Fix " > 0: By Proposition 5.1, for each k = 1; 2; :::; there is a monotone pure strategy equilibrium, b k ; of the uniform-price auction when unit-bids are restricted to the …nite set f0; 1=k; 2=k; :::; k=kg: It su¢ ces to show that for all k su¢ ciently large, b k is an "-equilibrium of the game in which unit-bids can be chosen from 0 ( ) instead of b( ); then regardless of his type and for any strategies the others might employ and for each j = 1; :::; m; bidder i will win a jth unit whenever b( ) would have won a jth unit although the price might be higher because his bid vector is higher, and he may win a jth unit when b( ) would not have. The increase in the price caused by the at most 1=k increase in each of his unit-bids can be no greater than 1=k; and because b j (t i ) t ij for every t i 2 T i ; the ex-post surplus lost on each additional unit won from employing b 0 ( ) instead of b( ) can be no greater than 1=k: Hence, the total ex-post loss in surplus as a result of the strategy change can be no greater than 2m=k; which can be made arbitrarily small for k su¢ ciently large, regardless of the others'strategies. Hence, i's expected utility loss from employing b 0 ( ) instead of b( ) is, for k large enough, less than "; and this holds uniformly in the others'strategies.
Proof of Corollary 5.5. Analogous to the proof of Corollary 5.2 above.
Proof of Lemma 5.3. Fix monotone pure strategies for all players but i: For the remainder of this proof, we omit most subscripts i to keep the notation manageable. Let v(b; t) denote bidder i's expected payo¤ from employing the bid vector b = (b 1 ; :::; b m ) when his type vector is t = (t 1 ; :::; t m ): Then, letting P k (b k ) denote the probability that bidder i wins at least k units -which depends only on his kth unit-bid b k -we have, where 1 k is an m-vector of k ones followed by m k zeros, where u(x) = 1 e rx r is bidder i's utility function with constant absolute risk aversion parameter r 0; where it is understood that u(x) = x when r = 0: Note that the dependence of r on i has been suppressed.
From now on we shall proceed as if r > 0 because all of the formulae employed here have well-de…ned limits as r tends to zero that correspond to the risk neutral case u(x) = x:
Letting w k (b k ; t) = As shown in (5.2) from subsection 5.1 (and setting p = p = 0 there), for each k = 2; :::; m; u(t 1 + ::: + t k ) u(t 1 + ::: + t k 1 ) = 1 r (1 e rt k )e r(t 1 +:::+t k 1 ) ; (A.9)
is nondecreasing in t according to the partial order i de…ned in (5.1). Henceforth, we shall employ the partial order i on i's type space. We next demonstrate the following facts.
(i) w k (b k ; t) is nondecreasing in t; and
(ii) w k ( b k ; t) w k (b k ; t) is nondecreasing in t for all b k b k ;
To see (i), write, The …rst term in the sum is nondecreasing in t according to i by (A.9) and the second term, being nondecreasing in the coordinatewise partial order is, a fortiori, nondecreasing in t according to i . Turning to (ii), if P k (b k ) = 0 then w k (b k ; t) = 0 and (ii) follows from (i). So, assume P k (b k ) > 0: Then, w k ( b k ; t) w k (b k ; t) = 1 r P k ( b k ) 1 e r(t k b k ) e r(t 1 +:::+t k 1 ) 1 r P k (b k ) 1 e r(t k b k ) e r(t 1 +:::+t k 1 ) The …rst term in the sum is nondecreasing in t according to i by (i) and the second term, being nondecreasing in the coordinatewise partial order is, a fortiori, nondecreasing in t according to i . This proves (ii).
Suppose now that the vector of bids b is optimal for bidder i when his type vector is t; and that b 0 is optimal when his type is t ; the bid vector b 00 obtained from b 0 by replacing its coordinates l + 1 through m with the coordinates l + 1 through m of b is a feasible (i.e., nonincreasing) bid vector. Consequently, because b 0 is optimal at t 0 we must have 0 v(b 0 ; t 0 ) v(b 00 ; t 0 ): But this di¤erence in utilities is precisely the di¤erence between the right-hand and left-hand sides of (A.11) multiplied by e r(b 1 +:::+b l ) ; thereby establishing (A.11).
Thus, we may conclude, after making use of (A.11) in (A.10) that, l with the coordinateby-coordinate larger unit bids b j ; :::; b l results in a bid vector that is optimal at t 0 : Applying this result …nitely often leads to the conclusion that b _ b 0 is optimal at t 0 ; as desired.
Lemma A.22. Consider the price competition game from subsection 5.3. Under the partial orders on types i de…ned there for each …rm i, each …rm possesses a monotone pure strategy best reply when the other …rms employ monotone pure strategies.
Proof. Suppose that all …rms j 6 = i employ monotone pure strategies according to j de…ned in subsection 5.3. Therefore, in particular, p j (c j ; x j ) is nondecreasing in c j for each x j ; and (5.6) applies. For the remainder of this proof, we omit most subscripts i to keep the notation manageable. Because …rm i's interim payo¤ function is continuous in his price for each of his types and because his action space, [0; 1]; is totally ordered and compact, …rm i possesses a largest best reply,p(c; x); for each of his types (c; x) 2 [0; 1] 2 : We will show thatp( ) is monotone according to i :
Let t = ( c; x); t = (c; x) in [0; 1] 2 be two types of …rm i; and suppose that t i t: @v i (p; t ) @p dp;
so that
) dp = ( c c)
where the inequality follows by (5.6) if p p 0 c: Therefore, v i (p; t) v i (p 0 ; t) v i (p; t) v i (p 0 ; t) 0; where the …rst inequality follows because t 0 = t; t 1 = t; and the second because p is a best reply at t: Therefore, we have shown the following: If p c; then Hence, if p c; thenp( t) = p p =p(t) becausep( t) is the largest best reply at t and because no best reply at t = ( c; x) is below c: On the other hand, if p < c; then p =p( t) c > p =p(t); where the …rst inequality again follows because no best reply at t is below c. We conclude that p p; as desired.
